Illusion vs Reality: Lexical Presupposition Triggers in the Narrative Tiers of Selected Characters in Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*

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**Abstract:**

This study is aimed at exploring the types, meaning and functions of lexical presupposition triggers employed in the narrative tiers in the portrayal of Gatsby and Daisy’s characters in Fitzgerald’s *The Great Gatsby*. To fulfill such aim, the researcher adapts a model proposed by Li (2010) and Du (2012) based on the theory of presupposition put forward by Levinson (1983) and Yule (1996). Through the descriptive qualitative approach, the data analysis shows that eight types of lexical triggers out of the nine studied are found—verbs of judging are not employed—and the most frequently employed one is the possessive. The analysis also brings into light the descriptive, narrative, thematic and symbolic purposes of these triggers along with their different functions. The results detect Fitzgerald’s bias towards what his characters represent, and reveal that presupposition present, to a greater extent, the atmosphere of illusion versus reality that dominates the novel.

**Keywords:** lexical presupposition triggers, illusion, Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby, bias.
1. Introduction

Speakers and writers use language to impart certain information so as to deliver certain messages. Some information is not stated directly but is taken by the addresser as something already known by the addressee. This phenomenon has come to be known as presupposition. Yule (1996) refers to presupposition as “something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance” (p. 25). Presupposition is triggered by certain words or grammatical constructions. Such items and constructions are termed presupposition triggers. Using these triggers, speakers and writers may influence their audience.

Authors, for instance, communicate certain notions in writing novels, plays, short stories or any other literary work. Sometimes they deal with some information as being something familiar. Put another way, some authors often presuppose that their readers already know a certain piece of information, thereby yielding a certain effect that intrigues their audience. Shedding light on one of the ingeniously crafted works, this research intends to study presupposition triggers in Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* (1925).

Above all, Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*, one of his most outstanding novels, explores the demise of the sought-after American Dream. This American Dream, or rather its doomed fate, is potently embodied in Jay Gatsby, the major figure in the novel from whom it takes its name. Gatsby has transformed himself from being no one into being the one; he becomes the most popular, wealthy figure in the city. However, his ultimate dream is getting Daisy Buchanan, the one whom he deeply cherishes, back. In the end, Daisy turns out, perhaps unsurprisingly, to be unworthy of his unrestrained love, his tenacious pursuit, and consequently of being the object of his dream.
Upon closer look, *The Great Gatsby*, as Bewley (1954) suggests, “is an attempt to determine that concealed boundary that divides the reality from the illusions” (p. 224). In this perspective, reality is but a promise: It is about having aspirations and faith that they will be achieved. This reality, or rather the conflict between reality and illusion, is brilliantly represented by Gatsby. He shows a persistent clinging to his aspirations for the seemingly non-existent future. Illusions, on the other hand, are the things that “seem more real than reality itself” (p. 225). They are embodied in other characters in the novel. For instance, Daisy is one representation of Gatsby’s illusions, for he only sees her, not through her. She functions as a veneer underneath which Gatsby aspires to escape a harsher reality.

Making one character Nick Carraway take his role, Fitzgerald retreats altogether. This, in turn, makes the novel “more natural, authentic, and credible through the narration of the eye-witness” (Liu, 2010, p. 418). Not just a witness though, Nick Carraway—Gatsby’s neighbor, Daisy’s cousin and Tom’s classmate at Yale—gets involved in the story. He is the vehicle for reuniting Gatsby and Daisy. Using Nick, Fitzgerald masterfully brings about the disillusionment with the American Dream, and consequently its decline.

Within his credible narration, Nick also exhibits an obstinate fascination with both Gatsby and Daisy. This fascination, which is patently seen in his description and narration about them, arguably influences the reader’s judgment. In this regard, this study attempts to show how Fitzgerald makes use of presupposition triggers in portraying his characters and developing his themes, and whether or not he shows bias against or in favor of any of these characters or themes.
1.1. Statement of the problem

There are, as Caffi (2006) argues, two levels of communication in discourse: explicit and implicit. While the “explicit communication is conveyed in the ongoing discourse, an intertwined level of implicit communication is unfolding: understanding a discourse requires an understanding of both” (p. 759). In the light of this very fact, this study seeks to analyze Fitzgerald’s use of presupposition triggers in *The Great Gatsby* as one of the tools he uses on the implicit communication level. This analysis is carried out mainly for the sake of reaching a better, full understanding of this literary work.

Another notable point that this present study addresses, and particularly distinguishes it from other studies, is the handling of the classification of presupposition triggers. Words like “when”, for example, may be either a conjunction or a relative adverb; as a result, the clause following it may function as an adverbial clause or a relative one respectively. In this way, the word “when” can trigger presupposition taking one of two forms, either a temporal clause or a non-restrictive relative clause. Recognizing the grammatical category of the word “when” is essential to determine its form as a presupposition trigger. This is one reason why the researcher parses the sentences containing presupposition throughout the study. Another significant reason is that parsing these sentences would easily make the presupposition it contains stand out. For instance, the complement clause functioning as an object of certain predicates is usually the presupposition they trigger, and the head noun in a noun phrase following restrictive expressions is simply what the presupposition is about. To clear such confusion with regard to the form of presupposition triggers and the presupposition they carry, the researcher follows the parsing method used by Leech, Deuchar and Hoogenraad (1982) in
their book “English Grammar for Today: A New Introduction”. In so doing, this study gains more credibility and value, and excels at dealing with the linguistic phenomenon of presupposition along with its triggers.

The researcher seeks to tackle three main points through conducting this study: how presupposition reveals the attitude of Fitzgerald in *The Great Gatsby*, whether or not his attitude biases readers towards the American Dream, and how tracing grammatical constituents functioning as complements of possible presupposition triggers makes the interpretation of presupposition easy and credible. Filling in these gaps, this study not only fathoms out presupposition in Fitzgerald’s novel, but also sets a better example of how to deal with this linguistic device efficiently. In this way, it approaches presupposition as an asset of writers and to readers.

1.2. Aim of the study

The objective of this study is first and foremost to identify the types of presupposition triggers that Fitzgerald employs with certain characters in *The Great Gatsby*, and to seek a better understanding of the meaning of these sentences containing presupposition. Moreover, it attempts to reflect how Fitzgerald employs presupposition as a means of character portrayal and delivery of ideas, and whether or not any kind of bias is evinced through the use of these triggers.

1.3. Research questions

In order to fulfill the aim of this research, the following questions are to be answered:

1. What types of lexical presupposition triggers are found in the narrative tiers in the portrayal of Gatsby and Daisy’s characters in *The Great Gatsby*?
2. What is the meaning of these presuppositions? And for what narrative purpose does Fitzgerald employ them?

3. Do these presuppositions reveal any bias on the part of the author?

1.4. Scope of the study

This study focuses on the narrative tiers in the portrayal of two of the main characters in Fitzgerald’s *The Great Gatsby*: Jay Gatsby and Daisy Buchanan. In this respect, it concentrates on examining the meaning of presupposition employed with the aforementioned characters, and how it contributes to the overall message of the novel. It also offers glimpses of the functions of some presuppositions that have been identified in regard to both the common functions of presupposition, and the descriptive, narrative, thematic and symbolic functions they take on in the novel.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Pragmatics

Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics that studies “speaker meaning” (Yule, 1996, p. 3). That is, it is concerned with the meaning that the speaker yields, not the literal meaning of words or phrases though partly dependent on it. The process of arriving at what the speaker genuinely means through his use of such words and phrases is fueled first and foremost by context.

In so doing, pragmatics, as Yule (1996, p. 4) contends, enables one to hypothesize about people’s intentions, assumptions, aims and actions (e.g. apology, request, offer and sympathy) that they are hinting at with their words whether they are performing them or urging others to. Sometimes the speaker does not include everything in his utterance, but the listener still deciphers his
meaning. Accordingly, pragmatics features shared knowledge between speakers and their audience as one of the cornerstones on which understanding utterances, and hence the speaker’s intended meaning, relies.

One pragmatic phenomenon in which background information and shared experience play a vital role in communication is presupposition. One does not start introducing himself to his friends, relatives and colleagues every time one shares a personal incident with them. Some information is already taken to be common ground, and the more knowledge we have in common, the fewer words we use in communication. Hence, presupposition is part and parcel of everyday interaction.

2.2. Presupposition

Presupposition, in the broadest sense of the term, is something that is believed to be true before evidence comes to light. In pragmatics, it has taken a slightly different tack: It is, so to speak, something that the speaker kindly imposes to be true sometimes regardless of the evidence. What if unequivocal evidence emerges? What if that evidence strongly refutes the given presuppositions? In such a case, if the speaker does not release another presupposition, manipulating the evidence, to impinge on the opponent’s recently held belief, then the original presuppositions simply “los[e] their status of presupposition” (Caffi, 2006, p. 762).

Above all, presupposition has received great interest in a number of branches of linguistics including semantics and pragmatics, but not that quite interest in syntax and stylistics. As a matter of fact, there are two main approaches to presupposition: semantic and pragmatic (Katz & Langendoen, 1976; Levinson, 1983). The former approach, on the one hand, is amenable to the
notion of truth value, and consequently coincides with entailment. That is, this very approach views presupposition as a relation between utterances: It has nothing to do with the context. The latter approach, on the other hand, maintains that the utterance with the presupposition must be interpreted within a context. It does not view presupposition as a semantic relation between two utterances, but rather, as Stalnaker (1970) contends, between speakers and propositions (cited in Caffi, 2006, p. 760). Levinson (1983, p. 225) concludes that presuppositions, in actual fact, are “the result of complex interactions between semantics and pragmatics”. To rigorously understand presupposition, one must blend the two approaches.

2.3. Presupposition triggers

Some words and grammatical constructions engender presupposition. These words and constructions have come to be known as presupposition triggers. First and foremost, Karttunen (n.d.) identifies thirty-one types of presupposition triggers (Levinson, 1983, p. 181). Levinson (1983, pp. 181-184) gives a brief overview of thirteen types of Karttunen’s triggers (e.g. definite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of state verbs, iteratives, verbs of judging, temporal clauses, cleft sentences, implicit clefts with stressed constituents, comparisons and contrasts, non-restrictive relative clauses, counterfactual conditionals and questions). In addition, he highlights other lexical items that can trigger presupposition such as manner adverbs and other particles including even, just and only (1983, pp. 184-185).

Making use of Karttunen’s triggers, Yule (1996, pp. 27-29) proposes six types of presupposition triggers: existential, factive, non-factive, lexical, structural and counterfactual. These types of
presupposition can all be summarized in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Presupposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>existential</td>
<td>the x</td>
<td>&gt;&gt;X exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factive</td>
<td>I regret leaving</td>
<td>&gt;&gt;I left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-factive</td>
<td>He pretended to be happy</td>
<td>&gt;&gt;He wasn’t happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lexical</td>
<td>He managed to escape</td>
<td>&gt;&gt;He tried to escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structural</td>
<td>When did she die?</td>
<td>&gt;&gt;She died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterfactual</td>
<td>If I weren’t ill,</td>
<td>&gt;&gt;I am ill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, other linguists and researchers have offered different classifications of presupposition triggers based on Karttunen and Yule’s models. First, Huang (2007, p. 66) notes that some presupposition triggers are lexical, while others are structural (constructional). Second, Khaleel (2010, p. 529) offers three categories of presupposition triggers: existential, lexical and structural. Third, Zare (2012) adds two more categories to the six triggers offered by Yule: relative and adverbial presupposition. Fourth, Pang (2016), Liang and Liu (2016) and Argina (2018) break down presupposition triggers into two main categories: lexical and syntactic. These models of presupposition triggers presented and adapted by these researchers will be thoroughly discussed in Section 3.

### 2.4. Functions of presupposition

Employing presupposition triggers as a camouflage for their genuine intentions, speakers along with writers presuppose, or maybe try to make it sound as if they presuppose, that their audience already knows a given piece of information for a certain end. By so doing, they have assigned certain functions to presupposition. Linguists and researchers have set to group and examine these
somehow concealed functions.

Yingfang (2007), in his journal article “An Analysis of Presupposition and Its Function in Advertisement”, examines some of the functions that presupposition can have in advertisement. The researcher tackles the orienting function, concealment function, targeting function and distance-shortening function. The article reveals that presupposition can direct people’s interest and thoughts to a predetermined notion set by the entity triggering that presupposition. In the same way that presupposition can direct our attention to some facets, it can also blind us to others. Reading between the lines, the use of presupposition can deceive people into believing non-existent facts, which the writer or speaker successfully establishes. Besides, since presupposition mainly consists in common background, it can easily target the intended group of people. In this regard, it also shortens the distance between readers or listeners, and writers or speakers, putting them on the same side of the bridge where there is common knowledge of the stated fact. Overall, the researcher pinpoints the persuasive effect together with the brevity and economy that the use of presupposition can yield in the advertisement.

Ge (2011) explores the “Pragmatic Functions of Presupposition in Advertising English”. The researcher discusses eight functions: conciseness function, interestingness function, enlargement function, emphasis function, euphemism function, concealment function, persuasion function and self-protection function. The first seven functions have been covered in Yingfang’s article (2007), but the eighth function—namely self-protection—comes to light in Ge’s article. Generally, advertisers tend to exaggerate and draw comparisons between their own products and
competitors’. Presupposition lessens the effect of that exaggeration and provides protection to those advertisers. This is mainly because what is stated through presupposition is just presupposed, not asserted to be true.

**Figure 1.** Presupposition Functions

Other researchers have studied the different presupposition functions in other types of advertisements such as mobile phone advertisements (e.g. Sari and Rohman, 2015) in which the functions of orienting, interestingness and conciseness are highlighted once more, and print advertising language (e.g. Pang, 2016). Figure 1 above illustrates the recurring presupposition functions.

2.5. Previous studies

A number of studies have been widely conducted in different fields using presupposition. These studies have mostly discussed the meaning of presupposition, types of presupposition and
functions of presupposition. Shedding light on presupposition triggers, most researchers employ either Karttunen's proposed model in Levinson (1983) or Yule's (1996) theory of presupposition. Some researchers have even proposed other classifications and models based on the two theories.

Concerning Yule’s (1996) theory, it has been widely applied in novels (Yohana, 2011; Havid & Ricco, 2012; Chandra, 2016), short stories (Oktoma & Mardiyono, 2013) and movies (Aditya, 2014; Prahadsini, 2016). As for Karttunen’s model (as cited in Levinson, 1983), it has also been employed in movies (Yoastri, 2013; Soviana, 2014) and TV shows (Azkhaf & Sholikhah, 2017). These studies are to be presented for two essential purposes: showing the importance and effects of employing presupposition, and bringing out the difference between these studies and the present study that seeks to better handle this linguistic phenomenon and cover all its facets.

Above all, researchers such as Khaleel (2010), Hasta and Marlina (2018), Zare (2012), Pang (2016), Liang and Liu (2016), and Argina (2018) have proposed and followed different models so as to study presupposition. To be precise, they have reclassified presupposition triggers on a number of levels based on Karttunen (Levinson, 1983) and Yule’s theories of presupposition. Such blended models were particularly of great value to the current research.

Based on the theories and various studies presented in this very section, the researcher finds it convenient to adapt the model of analysis blending both Karttunen and Yule’s triggers in a way that covers more ground. In addition, it successfully introduces the ongoing presupposition triggers, which will be reviewed in greater depth in the coming section.
### 3. Theoretical Framework

The model employed in this study is an adaptation of the model of Li (2010) and Du (2012) in the reclassification of presupposition triggers. This model is based on Karttunen’s model in Levinson (1983) along with Yule’s (1996) theory of presupposition. The researcher adapts this model for identifying presupposition triggers in the novel under consideration. Table 2 presents the model to follow in this study.

**Table 2. Categories of Presupposition Triggers (adapted from Argina, 2018)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presupposition Triggers</th>
<th>Classifications</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lexical Level</td>
<td>Verbs (predicates)</td>
<td>Factive verbs&lt;br&gt;Implicative verbs&lt;br&gt;Iterative verbs&lt;br&gt;Change-of-state verbs&lt;br&gt;Verbs of judging&lt;br&gt;Non-factive verbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restrictive Expressions</td>
<td>Possessives&lt;br&gt;Other expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Particles</td>
<td>Iterative particles&lt;br&gt;Other particles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The word “lexical” is derived from the Greek word “lexis”. Crystal (2008) defines it as “[a] term used in linguistics to refer to the vocabulary of a language”, and states that “[a] unit of
vocabulary is generally referred to as a lexical item, or lexeme” (p. 279). Hence, lexical items refer to word classes such as adjectives, adverbs, nouns, and verbs. A number of these lexical items can prompt presupposition in sentences. These items are termed “lexical triggers” (Finch, 2000, p.174). Lexically, presupposition triggers may take the form of verbs, restrictive expressions, iterative particles and other particles.

3.1. Verbs

According to Finch (2000), verbs are classified into two main types: lexical verbs and auxiliary verbs (aux). The former are those main verbs (Mvs) in verb phrases (VPs), which can occur on their own such as create, build and succeed. The latter are further classified into primary auxiliaries and model auxiliaries (m). Primary auxiliaries, on the one hand, can stand as main verbs in verb phrases (e.g. be, do and have), and consequently they can act as a lexical verb. On the other hand, model auxiliaries (e.g. can, could, may, might, shall, should, will and would) cannot stand on their own in verb phrases, and must be accompanied by a lexical verb. Lexical verbs, according to the proposed model in Table 2.3., are categorized into six types: factive, implicative, iterative, change-of-state, verbs of judging and non-factive.

3.1.1. Factive verbs

As Crystal (2008, p. 184) puts it, a factive verb is “a verb which takes a complement clause”, and in which the speaker assumes the presupposition presented in that complement clause to be true. That is, the information following this type of verbs is taken to be a fact. This can be illustrated in the following examples (Yule, 1996, p.28):

[1] a. She $P_{VP^{Aux}}^{Mv} \overline{\text{didn’t}} \overline{\text{realize}}^{O_{NCl}}[\text{he was ill}]. \text{ (>> He was ill.)}$
   b. We $P_{VP^{Mv}}^{Mv} \overline{\text{regret}}^{O_{NCl}}[\text{telling him}]. \text{ (>> We told him.)}$
The verbs “realize” in [1a.] and “regret” in [1b.] presuppose the truth of the complement clauses following them. Thus, they have what Yule (1996, p.27) labels “factive presupposition”. In addition, Crystal (2008) maintains that factive predicates can take grammatical categories other than verbs, namely adjective and noun structures as can be clearly seen in [2]:

[2] a. It’s $_{\text{Adj}}^{C}$(H$_{\text{Adj}}$ surprising $M_{\text{NCI}}^{M}[$that he left]). (>> He left.)

b. It’s $_{\text{NP}}^{C}$(M$_{\text{d}}$a $H_{\text{N}}$ shame $M_{\text{NCI}}^{M}[$that he left]). (>> He left.)

In [2a.], the “be surprising that” adjective construction presupposes the truth of the clause “he left”. Similarly, the noun construction “be a shame that” in [2b.] presupposes the fact that “he left”.

Karrttunen (1971) classifies factive verbs into two types: factives and semi-factives. Factives include verbs such as regret, whereas semi-factives include verbs such as discover, find out, notice, see and realize. He further pinpoints that the difference between the two is clear in some contexts when they co-occur with “certain modal operators” (p. 65). An illustrative example of such contexts can be seen in [3].

[3] a. She $_{\text{VP}}^{P}$(m Aux will $M_{\text{V}}^{V}$ regret) $O_{\text{NCI}}^{O}[$that she left early].
    (>> She left early.)

b. She $_{\text{VP}}^{P}$(m Aux will $M_{\text{V}}^{V}$ discover) $O_{\text{NCI}}^{O}[$that she left early].
    (>> It’s possible she left.)

In [3a.], the verb phrase “will regret” presupposes the truth of its complement clause “she left early”. The verb phrase “will discover” in [3b.], in contrast, presupposes the possibility that its complement clause is true. This is mainly due to the fact that she may discover something that is not necessarily true. Owing to co-occurring with the modal “will”, the verb “regret” is labelled “a factive verb”, while the verb “discover” is labelled “a semi-factive verb” in the
given context. In this regard, Schueler (2016) elaborates on the hypothesis that factive predicates are not the real triggers for presupposition; another element co-occurring with them carries the presupposition.

However, Leech (1981) reclassifies factives into pure factives and conditional factives. First, pure factives are the kind of verbs that are mainly accompanied by that-clauses or –ing clauses (e.g. amuse, appreciate, bear in mind, be sorry, know, realize and regret). Second, conditional factives are the kind of verbs that are mainly accompanied by infinitives and nominalizations (e.g. become, cause, force, have to, hear and see). Examples of pure and conditional factives are given respectively in [4a.] and [4b.]:

[4] a. I’m \[ AjP \left( \text{Aj} \text{sorry} \text{M} \text{NCI} \right) \left( \text{that her son broke the vase} \right) \].

\[ \text{(} \text{Her son broke the vase).} \]

b. That horror movie \[ VP \left( \text{caused} \right) \text{NCI} \left( \text{S(her)} \text{to shiver} \right) \].

\[ \text{(} \text{She shivered.)} \]

In addition, he provides a sharp distinction between the two types that lies in negation: The complement of a factive verb remains true under negation only if it is a pure factive (Leech, 1981). For instance, the factive verb “know” in [5a.] presupposes the truth of the clause “Tom is coming”, even when negated in [5b.]. On the contrary, the factive verb “force” does not presuppose the truth of the clause “she came to the wedding” when it is negated as in [5d.]; only when it is in the affirmative form does it presuppose the truth of its complement clause as in [5c.].

[5] a. Robin \[ VP \left( \text{knows} \right) \text{NCI} \left( \text{cj that S(Tom)} \text{is coming} \right) \].

\[ \text{(} \text{Tom is coming.)} \]

b. Robin \[ VP \left( \text{does not know} \right) \text{NCI} \left( \text{that Tom is coming} \right) \].

\[ \text{(} \text{Tom is coming.)} \]
c. Her mother $^P_{VP}$forced $^O_{NCli}[S_{(her)}^P_{(to~come)}^A_{(to~the~wedding)}]$. (>> She came to the wedding.)

d. Her mother $^P_{VP}$did not force $^O_{NCli}[her~to~come~to~the~wedding]$. 

Another recent classification of factive predicates is provided by Huang (2007, p. 66) who offers two subtypes: cognitive or epistemic factives and emotive factives. The former subtype expresses a fact, while the latter reveals a feeling about a given fact. For instance, the verb “realize” in [1a.] is considered a cognitive factive as it denotes the state of being conscious of the fact that “he was ill”; on the other hand, the verb “regret” in [1b.] is regarded as an emotive factive because it expresses a strong feeling of regret towards the fact of “telling him”.

3.1.2. Implicative verbs

Karttunen (1971) suggests the term “implicative verb”, and refers to it as a verb that “carries a presupposition that it represents a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of its complement sentence” (p. 357). That is, an implicative verb (e.g. bother, care, dare, forget, manage, remember and venture) resembles a factive verb in that it somehow denotes the truth of the information that it introduces.

In this regard, Yule (1996, p. 28) contends that implicative verbs yield two types of meaning: asserted (factive) and non-asserted (presupposed) meaning. The following examples are used to illustrate Yule’s statement:

[6] a. Sarah $^P_{VP}$managed/didn’t manage $^O_{NCli}[P_{(to~arrive)}^A_{(on~time)}]$. (>>Sarah tried to arrive on time.)

b. Daniel $^P_{VP}$forgot/didn’t forget $^O_{NCli}[P_{(to~take)}^O_{(the~bus)}]$. (>>Daniel ought to have taken, or intended to take, the bus.)
When one says that somebody managed to do something, one asserts the person’s success in doing that thing and presupposes the idea that this person has been trying to accomplish the given action. Hence, the asserted meaning of the verb “manage” in [6a.] is Sarah’s on-time arrival, but the presupposed one is Sarah’s attempt to arrive on time. Likewise, the verb “forgot” in [6b.] asserts that Daniel did not take the bus, but presupposes that he wanted or intended to take it. In both cases, when negating these verbs, the asserted meaning is negated as well but the presupposed one remains constant.

Erdmann (1974) argues that the major distinction between factive and implicative verbs is that “negated factive predicates do not imply the negation of their complement, whereas implicative predicates imply the negation of their to-infinitives” (p. 53). For instance, the negation of “know” in [7a.] does not negate the clause “Mary had left”. The negation of “dare” in [7b.], on the other hand, negates the infinitive clause.

[7] a. John \( P_{VP}(\text{did not know}) \) \( O_{NCl}[\text{that Mary had left}]. \) 

\( \text{>>>(\text{Mary had left})). \)

b. Mary \( P_{VP}(\text{did not dare}) \) \( O_{NCl[i]}[P_{NCl}[\text{(to leave)}] \text{ } O_{NCl}[(\text{her room})]]. \)

\( \text{>>>(\text{Mary did not leave her room})]. \)

3.1.3. Iterative verbs

Crystal (2008, p. 257) defines “iterative” as a term that reflects “an event which takes place repeatedly”. A line of distinction then must be drawn between repetition and habits. Though the object of the two examples (Bussmann, Trauth, & Kazzazi, 1996, p. 604) mentioned below in [8] is the same, the predicates are different.

[8] a. She \( P_{VP}(\text{kept}) \) \( O_{NCling}[P_{NCl}[\text{(hugging)}] \text{ } O_{NCling}[(\text{her cat})]]. \)
The predicate “kept” in [8a.], on the one hand, signals repetition of the act of hugging. On the other hand, the predicate “likes” in [8b.] denotes the fact that hugging the cat is a habit, something that she always does. Levinson (1983, p. 182) introduces a number of iterative verbs such as come back, repeat, restore and return. He also presents some iterative expressions other than verbs that will be discussed in Section 3.3.

### 3.1.4. Change-of-state verbs

One of the presupposition triggers collected by Karttunen (as cited in Levinson, 1983) is the change-of-state verbs. Saeed (2003) argues that “[t]hese verbs have a kind of switch presupposition” (p. 107). In other words, verbs in this category indicate a state that has not been there before; either an action starts or ends. The verb “stop” in example [9] below (Sellars, 1954, p. 202) signals the end of beating, and hence presupposes that there has been an act of beating that continued for a certain period but no longer exists in the present. Additional examples of change-of-state verbs include arrive, begin, carry on, cease, come, enter, finish, leave and start. These verbs reflect a state of switching a certain action.

[9] Jones \( P_{VP}^{AUX} \) has \( M_v \) stopped \( O_{NCling}^{P}(beating) \) \( O \) (his grandmother).

(>>Jones had been beating his grandmother.)

### 3.1.5. Verbs of judging

Fillmore (1969) tackles verbs of judging in the light of three terms: situation, defendant and judge. First, the situation is the action that takes place and that is being referred to. Second, the
defendant is the person who contributes to the situation. Third, the judge is the person who makes a judgment either about the situation or the defendant. He proposes the following example:

[10] John $^p_{VP}$(accused) $^O_{NP}$(Harry) $^A_{PCling}$[of writing the letter].

($>>$Jones thinks writing the letter is something bad.)

The situation in [10] is the –ing noun clause “writing the letter”, the defendant is “Harry”, and the judge is “John”. The given example implies that “writing the letter” is something bad inasmuch as it becomes an accusation. Accordingly, it presupposes that John thinks that writing the letter is a bad thing to do. The presupposition then is not ascribed to the speaker, but to the subject of the verb (Levinson, 1983).

3.1.6. Non-factive verbs

Kartunen (1971a) divides verbs taking that-complement into two groups: factive and non-factives. He argues that factive verbs “carry along that the speaker’s presupposition that the complement sentence represents a true proposition”, whereas non-factive verbs “are not accompanied by a similar presupposition” (p. 340).

Leech (1981) distinguishes between three types of predicates: factive, non-factive and counterfactive. In this regard, he maintains that the three types are not completely different as some verbs may belong to more than one type. Examples of non-factive verbs are assume, believe, dream, imagine, pretend, suspect and think. Such verbs imply that the information following is not true. Hence, they have what Yule (1996, p.29) labels “non-factive presupposition”. For example, the verb “pretend” in [11] presupposes the non-factuality of the infinitive clause.

[11] He $^p_{VP}$(pretends) $^O_{NClit}$[$^p_{VP}$(to be) $^C_{(ill)}$].

($>>$ He is not ill.)
3.2. Restrictive expressions

“Restricted expressions” is a term used to refer to those words (determiners) that are used to modify nouns or pronouns, and consequently restrict these nouns and pronouns to a certain field or category. These expressions include the definite article (the), possessive adjectives (e.g. her, his, our and their), and other determiners such as only. By modifying a person or a thing, these expressions reveal the existence of that person or thing. For example, “your house” not only presupposes the existence of a house, but also that you own that house. In this perspective, Yule (1996) introduces the term “existential presupposition”. In this study, however, the researcher does not consider the definite article “the” as the model in Table 2 indicates; the main focus in this category is on possessive adjectives and other restricting determiners.

3.3. Particles

The word “particle”, which generally means a small part of something, is used as a grammatical term that broadly refers to “any lexical item which exhibits no inflectional morphology and hence is invariable in form” (Trask, 1993, p. 201). Particles may be open-class words such as adverbs like “again”, or closed-class words such as certain markers, conjunctions, interjections and prepositions in phrasal verbs (Leech et al., 1982; Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1985; Trask, 1993). Examples of closed-class particles are the infinitive marker “to”, the negative marker “not” (Crystal, 2008, p. 352), and adverbs and prepositions that show direction or position in phrasal verbs such as “back” in the phrasal verb “come back”.

Some particles can trigger certain presuppositions.
According to the model proposed in this study, these particles can be classified into two sub-categories: iterative particles and other particles. Along with the iterative verbs (discussed in Section 3.1.3), Levinson (1983) highlights other lexical expressions that signal the occurrence of an activity over and over again as can be seen in the following example:


(>> Amanda wrote a complaint letter before.)

In the example above, the adverb “again” presupposes that Amanda wrote a complaint letter before. Other words or phrases—such as anymore, another time and too—also denote the repetition of an action or a situation, and hence are labeled “iterative particles”.

Moreover, there are a number of other lexical particles that do not convey repetition or the existence of an entity but have other underlying presuppositions. They may reflect an act of continuation or cease, for instance. Examples of these words are still, even, no longer, just, anymore and not only. Other particles reflect different meanings as can be illustrated in the following utterance in [13] (Liang & Liu, 2016, p. 71). The word “even” presupposes that not everyone sees that it is easy to become a president, but it is not that difficult.

[13] You can be anything you want to be. Even President of the United States.

(>> Everyone thinks becoming a president is difficult.)

All in all, the use of certain words or expressions can trigger presupposition. These words may presuppose the existence, factuality, non-factuality, start, termination or repetition of a certain activity. They may also imply the existence of a totally different activity, depending on the context.
4. Methodology

The data of this research is collected and analyzed using the descriptive qualitative approach. The researcher first identifies the types of presupposition triggers used with the concerned characters in terms of their type and form. Then, the frequency of the occurrences of these presupposition triggers with each character is detected and compared. Afterwards, an example of each form of presupposition trigger is selected for the sake of highlighting the narratological and descriptive purposes behind Fitzgerald’s use of such triggers.

5. Data Analysis

The total number of lexical presupposition triggers is 254. These 254 triggers include 128 (50.4%) verbs, 94 (37%) restrictive expressions and 32 (12.6%) particles as indicated in Table 3 below that shows these three lexical sub-categories put in descending order of frequency. Following the table, Figure 2 also provides a better view of the proportions of these lexical triggers correlated with Gatsby and Daisy.

Table 3. Distribution of Lexical Triggers Employed with Gatsby and Daisy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical Presupposition Triggers</th>
<th>Gatsby</th>
<th>Daisy</th>
<th>G.,&amp;D.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive Expressions</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particles</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Table 3 and Figure 2 above, the most frequently used lexical presupposition triggers are verbs, whereas the least frequently used ones are particles. They also indicate that Gatsby has the highest proportion of verbs, restrictive expressions and particles: 94 (73.4%), 66 (70.2%) and 15 (46.9%) respectively. Daisy, on the other hand, has the lowest proportion of them: 25 (19.5%) verbs, 28 (29.8%) restrictive expressions and 12 (37.5%) particles. With both characters together, a number of lexical triggers are employed: 9 (7%) verbs and 5 (15.6%) particles. No restrictive expressions are employed with both Gatsby and Daisy simultaneously. Each lexical sub-category is broken down and analyzed in greater detail in the sections to follow.

5.1. Verbs

Verbs, as mentioned in the previous section, are used to trigger presupposition 128 times. Table 4 and Figure 3 below show the distribution of these 128 verbs as follows: 46 (36%) non-factive verbs, 42 (32.8%) factive verbs, 31 (24.2%) change-of-state verbs,
8 (6.2%) iterative verbs and 1 (0.8%) implicative verb. Overall, the most frequently used type of verbs is the non-factive verb, whereas the least frequently used one is the implicative verb. Verbs of judging are not used with any of the characters concerned. In regard of characters, the most frequently used type of verbs with Gatsby is the factive verb, with Daisy it is the change-of-state verb, and with both it is the non-factive verb. A point to be born in mind is that such high proportion of these verbs contributes to the central theme of illusion versus reality. In addition, the use of change-of-state verbs with Daisy, in particular, emphasizes her duplicity and alternating states. That is, she is torn between two attitudes to life: high social status and material gain.

Table 4. Distribution of Verbs Employed with Gatsby and Daisy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verbs</th>
<th>Gatsby</th>
<th>Daisy</th>
<th>G.&amp;,D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-factive</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factive</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change-of-state</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iterative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbs of judging</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 133 -
These proportions of the five types of verbs found in the data studied are presented and analyzed in the following five sections. In dealing with verbs, the researcher underlines the predicate triggering the presupposition and parses its complement that carries the information presented as the possible presupposition.

5.1.1. Non-factive verbs

The most frequently used type of lexical verbs is the non-factive verb that takes place 46 times constituting 36% of all verbs studied. Of these 46 verbs, 33 (71.7%) are used with Gatsby, 5 (10.9%) are used with Daisy, and 8 (17.4%) are used with both.

Trigger 1: “his dream must have seemed so close that he could hardly fail to grasp it” (p. 115).

The presupposition trigger given above is classified as a non-factive verb as it denotes the non-factuality of its complement. In the sentence “\(S_{NP}(his\, dream)\, P_{VP}(must\, have\, seemed)\, C_{AjP}(\, M_{Av\, so\, H_{Aj\, close\, M}}\, C_{CCI}[that\, he\, could\, hardly\, fail\, to\, grasp\, it])\)”, the linking verb “seem” signals a state of falsity of its subject complement. That is, it
implies the negation of the adjective phrase. Hence, it presupposes that Gatsby’s dream was not so close; on the contrary, it was extremely far than he could imagine, for it was not what he thought it was.

This presupposition trigger, which takes place at the end of the last chapter in the novel, has both descriptive and thematic functions. First, it stresses the fact that Gatsby had strong, unwavering faith in his dream that he was entirely blinded to the truth, for, in reality, the dream was far, faint and delusive. At no point did he have any doubt about its unreality. In this way, the trigger brings out the romantic, aspirant character of Gatsby as established by Nick in Chapter I. Second, it brings to light two main themes in the novel: illusion versus reality and the decline of the American Dream. In a way, Gatsby did not actually lack the vision, but the dream itself was corrupt and inaccessible. It was different in his head; it was closer and more real than ever. This trigger, in turn, is a perfect reflection of the non-factuality of Gatsby’s aspirations, and hence of the delusion and inaccessibility of the American Dream.

5.1.2. Factive verbs

The second frequently used type of lexical verbs is the factive verb that occurs 42 times constituting 32.8% of all verbs found. Of these 42 verbs, 35 (83.3%) are used with Gatsby, and 7 (16.7%) are used with Daisy. No factive verbs are used with both characters simultaneously.

**Trigger 2:** “he found what a grotesque thing a rose and how raw the sunlight was upon the scarcely created grass” (p. 103).

The presupposition trigger in the above-mentioned sentence is listed among factive verbs as it denotes the factuality of the
information presented in its complement clause. In the given sentence, the factive predicate “found” asserts the truth of its complement clause: $\omega_{VP}(\text{found})_{ONCl}[C(\text{what a grotesque thing})_{S}(a\text{ rose})_{P}(is)]_{cj}\text{and }[C(\text{how raw})_{S}(the sunlight)_{P}(was)_{A}(upon\text{ the scarcely created grass})]$. In this way, it presupposes the fact that the rose concerned is a grotesque thing. Such presupposition is further reinforced by being paralleled to another preconceived fact, which is the natural, raw state of the sunlight upon the grass.

This presupposition trigger that takes place at the end of Chapter eight, shortly before Gatsby was murdered, has thematic and narrative functions. A rose here, of course, refers to Daisy Faye, whose name means “flower fairy” (Settle, 1985, p. 117). In this very moment, Gatsby has come to realize the ugly truth of Daisy, and the futility of his aspirations and existence. Feeling such disillusionment, Gatsby must have died from within long before Wilson murders him. In this regard, this trigger, declaring that time has come for Gatsby to face the final curtain, functions as the novel’s denouement, for it represents the actual death of Gatsby along with his apparently corrupted, false dream.

5.1.3. Change-of-state verbs

The change-of-state verb comes third in the most frequent lexical verbs as it is used 31 times, constituting 24.2% of the verbs extracted. Of these 31 verbs, 18 (58.1%) are used with Gatsby, 12 (38.7%) are used with Daisy, and just 1 (3.2%) is used with both.

**Trigger 3:** “The instant her voice broke off, ceasing to compel my attention, my belief, I felt the basic insincerity of what she had said” (p. 13).
The above-mentioned presupposition trigger is classified as a change-of-state verb as it signals a reverse state of the activity accompanying the verb. In the adverbial clause \( ^{P}_{VP}(\text{ceasing}) \) \(^{O}_{\text{NCli}}(\text{to compel})^{O}(\text{my attention})^{O}(\text{my belief}) \)”, the verb “cease” switches the action of the noun clause (NCli) functioning as its object; in other words, it denotes the end of the compelling process. Thus, it presupposes that there has been an act of compelling that continued for a certain period, but it no longer exists at that time, when the utterance was made: Daisy had been compelling Nick’s attention and belief, using only her voice.

As a matter of fact, Fitzgerald uses Daisy’s voice as one of the main features in the portrayal of her character. Throughout the novel, he uses a number of presupposition triggers to divulge how powerful her voice is (e.g. “her low, thrilling voice” (p.8) and “made her voice huskier and more charming than ever” (p.95)). In this regard, Settle (1985) suggests that Daisy is an emblem of classical siren. Like sirens irresistibly draw sailors, Daisy compels both Nick and Gatsby, at the instigation of her voice, to move towards her whether physically or emotionally. Earlier at dinner, Nick also gives out the fact that “her voice compelled [him] forward breathlessly as [he] listened” (Fitzgerald, p. 11). Another point of similarity to sirens is that Daisy eventually brings about Gatsby’s death like that of sailors’. Daisy does not tell Tom that it was her who was driving the car, which is, as Settle puts it down, “an act of omission on the part of Daisy that leads to Gatsby’s killing at the hands of Myrtle’s husband” (p. 118). Thus, Fitzgerald employs such crafty presuppositions so as to delineate her voice, and show the strong effect it can yield.
**Trigger 4:** “the colossal significance of that light had now vanished forever” (p. 60)

The presupposition trigger above is categorized as a change-of-state verb because it indicates an alternating state of a certain activity that it introduces. In the following noun clause: \[ NCI^S_{NP}(the\ \text{colossal\ significance\ of\ that\ light}) \cdot \text{had}^A(\text{now}) \cdot \text{vanished}^P(\text{forever}) \], the verb “vanish” switches the state of existence of the noun phrase functioning as its subject. It thus triggers the presupposition that there had been a colossal significance of the light before.

Throughout the novel, Fitzgerald refers to the green light three times—the first time is in the novel’s beginning (Chapter one), the second in its middle (Chapter five), and the third is in the end (Chapter nine)—and two of them contain presupposition. This green light comes from the end of the Buchanan’s house dock, and takes on different representations in the novel. In Chapter one, the green light seems to be a symbol for Gatsby’s aspirations; in this regard, it represents Gatsby’s tenacious quest for Daisy and money, and consequently it symbolizes his American Dream. Then, as the novel progresses in Chapter five, it somehow loses all of its significance as highlighted in this given trigger above. This is mainly due to the fact that he is now with Daisy asserting his identity in the world of East Egg. Finally, in Chapter nine, Fitzgerald, or Nick to be precise, “expand[s] the significance of the green light […] beyond Daisy to the promises of the future offered by America throughout history” (Tate, 2007, p. 96). Accordingly, Fitzgerald has brilliantly employed this trigger to serve thematic, symbolic and narrative functions as illustrated.
5.1.4. Iterative verbs

The fourth frequently used type of verbs is the iterative verb, which is employed 8 times constituting 6.2% of all lexical verbs. Of these 8 verbs, 7 (87.5%) are used with Gatsby, and only 1 (12.5) is used with Daisy. No iterative verbs are used with both characters together, which may be interpreted as a sign that the past they shared cannot be repeated.

**Trigger 5:** “he revalued everything in his house according to the measure of response it drew from her well-loved eyes” (p. 59)

Since the verb “revalue” in the above-mentioned sentence means to consider the value of something again, it is categorized as an iterative verb. This is mainly because it signals the repetition of the act of valuing the object following it as indicated: \( P_{VP}(\text{revalued}) \) \( O_{NP(\text{everything})} \) \( M_{PP(\text{in his house})} \) \( A_{PP(\text{according to})} \) \( N_{PP(d) \text{ the measure}} \) \( M_{PP(\text{of response})} \) \( M_{RCI(\text{it drew from her well-loved eyes})} \). That is to say, it presupposes that Gatsby reconsidered the value of all things that had been in his house on the basis of the looks Daisy had on her face towards these things.

This trigger, once more, serves to reinforce Gatsby’s aspirations for reuniting with Daisy; in fact, he seeks to accumulate a huge amount of wealth only to find his way back with her. He has long fantasized about impressing her with what he had obtained—his car, house, possessions and power—that he could not take his eyes off her to see if he succeeded. Daisy’s response to these possessions, for Gatsby, brings them into actual existence, gives meaning to the acts he committed, and proves his journey so far worthwhile. Thus, Fitzgerald artfully sneaks in this presupposition trigger in order to stress Gatsby’s dogged persistence in reaching his dream, and gain admiration for his romantic and aspirational nature and his strong love for Daisy.
5.1.5. Implicative verbs

The least frequently used type of verbs is the implicative verb. Constituting 0.8% of lexical verbs, it occurs only once with Gatsby as indicated in the given trigger below.

**Trigger 6:** “With an effort I managed to restrain my incredulous laughter.” (p. 42)

This trigger is categorized as an implicative verb because it yields two types of meaning—it has an asserted meaning that triggers another non-asserted one. In the noun clause “^{S(I)P}_O^{NCII}(managed)^{O}_{NCII}[to restrain my incredulous laughter]”, the asserted meaning of the verb “manage” is the success of carrying out the action given in the infinitive noun clause functioning as its object. The non-asserted (presupposed) meaning, on the other hand, is that there has been an attempt to carry out that action. Thus, this verb, here, presupposes that Nick tried to restrain his incredulous laughter.

This presupposition trigger, taking place in Chapter four when Gatsby is telling Nick about the experiences he had during his wartime, has narrative and thematic functions. First and foremost, it anticipates Nick’s conflicting states towards Gatsby. For most of the time, Nick believes in Gatsby and his dream, but there are also times when he experiences moments of doubt. Second, Fitzgerald, in this way, projects his own personal experience onto Gatsby (Tyson, 2006, p. 193). He has shaken faith in the American Dream, and hence widely condemns it throughout the novel. Thus, this presupposition contributes to anticipating the turn of the events, and reinforces the theme of the disillusionment
of the American Dream.

So far, the researcher has tackled the five types of verbs found in the data: non-factive, factive, change-of-state, iterative and implicative. In what follows, the other two lexical categories are presented and analyzed.

### 5.2. Restrictive expressions

Restrictive expressions are used to trigger presupposition 94 times. Table 5 and Figure 4 below show the distribution of these 94 expressions. They show Fitzgerald’s employment of 86 (91.5%) possessives and 8 (8.5%) other expressions. The most frequently used type of restrictive expressions is the possessive. These two sub-categories are discussed more closely in the following two sections.

#### Table 5. Distribution of Restrictive Expressions Employed with Gatsby and Daisy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictive Expressions</th>
<th>Gatsby</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Daisy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>G.,&amp;D.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possessives</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expressions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.1. Possessives

Possessives occur 86 times: 61 (70.9%) are used with Gatsby, and 25 (29.1%) are used with Daisy. No possessives are employed with both characters together. Upon closer look, the researcher finds that a number of possessives are used to trigger the same presupposition over and over again.

Trigger 7: “Gatsby’s house” (p. 27; 37; 39; 41; 52; 99; 102; 103; 114; 115)

This trigger is categorized as a restrictive expression, namely a possessive. In the noun phrase, “$^{S}_{NP}(^{M}_{GP}(^{G}_{NP}(Gatsby’s)^{H}_{NP} house))$”, the genitive phrase taking the form of a noun “Gatsby” followed by the possessive marker (‘s) asserts the existence of a house owned by Gatsby.

In the novel, certain presuppositions occur frequently with each of the characters using possessives. The prominent existential presuppositions occurring with Gatsby in descending order of
frequency indicate the existence of the following entities: a house, a car, a lawn, parties, a drive, a garden, guests, suits and a dream. The most frequent presupposition triggered by possessives with Gatsby is the existence of a house, namely his house, which accounts for the symbolic significance of this house in the novel. Gatsby’s house represents the hollowness of his life and his attempts to fit into the wealthy world.

On the other hand, the prominent existential presuppositions taking place with Daisy in descending order of frequency show the existence of the following items: a unique voice, a dress, a daughter and a house. The most frequent presupposition triggered by possessives with Daisy, needless to say, is the existence of a type of voice. This trigger, once more, reinforces the significance of Daisy’s voice as one of the main features of her character (see Trigger 3).

5.2.2. Other expressions

Restrictive expressions other than possessives occur 8 times: 5 (62.5%) are used with Gatsby, 3 (37.5%) are used with Daisy, and none is used with both characters at the same time. The most frequent expression of these is the particle “only”, occurring 3 times with Daisy and 2 times with Gatsby, and its synonym “merely”, occurring once with Gatsby. The other two expressions left are the determiners “another” and “other”, each occurring once with Gatsby.

**Trigger 8:** “only the dead the dream fought on as the afternoon slipped away” (p. 86).

This presupposition trigger is classified as a restrictive expression because it restricts a number of possibilities to one that
it refers to. In the sentence above, the adverb “only” functions as a pre-modifier of the noun “dream” in the following noun phrase: “\(\text{NP}^M_{\text{AV}} \text{only}^M_{\text{d}} \text{the}^M_{\text{Aj}} \text{dead}^H_{\text{N}} \text{dream})\). It thus restricts the things that fought on to one thing, which is the dead dream. In this way, it presupposes that there were actually other things that ought to have fought on that afternoon.

Serving both descriptive and narrative functions, this trigger takes place in Chapter seven at the end of the confrontation between Gatsby, Tom and Daisy. It shows Gatsby’s clinging to his dream of having Daisy back. Despite all things she said and showed in that confrontation, he is still devoted to her. In this light, it reflects the romantic nature of Gatsby’s character, and his firm belief, hopes and aspirations for his seemingly unattainable ideal.

5.3. Particles

Particles are used to trigger presupposition 32 times. Gatsby has a slightly higher proportion of particles than Daisy: 15 (46.9%) and 12 (37.5%) respectively. Other particles that are used to trigger presupposition around both characters take place 5 times, constituting 15.6% of the overall particles found. The most frequently occurring particles are “again”, “back”, “no longer”, “once more” and “anymore” with frequencies of 14, 6, 3, 2 and 2 respectively. Other particles, including “too”, “once”, “any longer”, “just” and “still”, occur only once.

**Trigger 9:** “a romantic readiness […] which is not likely I shall ever find again” (p. 4).

The particle “again” is classified as an iterative particle inasmuch as it signals the fact that a certain activity takes place over
and over again. In the given relative clause “$I_{VP}^{I_{Aux}M_{Av}}$ shall $M_{Av}^{M_{VP}}$ ever $M_{Av}^{M_{VP}}$ find $M_{Av}^{M_{VP}}$ again)”, which functions as a post-modifier of the noun phrase “($M_{d}^{M_{Av}}$ romantic $H_{N}$ readiness)”, the particle “again” accompanied by the negation adverb “ever” triggers the presupposition that Nick did not find the romantic readiness that Gatsby has before nor shall he find it in the future. In this way, negating the particle “again” eliminates the possibility that Nick could come across anyone with such strong romantic willingness of Gatsby.

Employing this trigger in the very first pages of the novel in Chapter one, Fitzgerald masterfully foreshadows how extraordinary Gatsby is and will be in the eyes of Nick. It may also be interpreted as an indicator of Fitzgerald’s bias in favor of Gatsby, and subsequently the American Dream. Thus, this trigger functions as a narrative device that impinges on the reader’s perception, and lays the groundwork for Nick’s extreme fascination with the character of Gatsby.

6. Conclusion

Lexical presupposition triggers found in the narrative tiers of Gatsby and Daisy’s characters are 254. In this vein, Fitzgerald triggers presuppositions in the simplest way by using one form that has a certain asserted meaning to communicate another non-asserted one. Accordingly, this may be interpreted as reflecting one of the aspects of his style of writing.

Possessives, followed by non-factive verbs, are by far the most frequently employed form of lexical presupposition triggers. This finding is unequivocally in accordance with one of the
principal focuses of the novel: material gain and illusions. In addition, a number of presuppositions are repeatedly triggered by the use of different forms of possessives. Concerning Gatsby, the most frequently triggered presupposition is the existence of a house, particularly his house. Gatsby’s house, of course, is a central symbol in the novel. It represents a number of notions: the hollowness of Gatsby’s life, his endeavor to fit into the world of the rich who owns such houses, and his love for Daisy and attempts to secure her desires. As for Daisy, the most frequently triggered presupposition is the existence of a certain type of voice, namely her voice. Daisy’s voice plays a significant role in the portrayal of her character, making people sympathize with, fall for, and physically move towards her.

It is no surprise that verbs of judging are not found in any of the data extracted. From the very beginning of the novel, Nick clearly states that he, following his father’s lead, is not disposed to make judgments about people. Verbs of judging would normally create a setting where there are a judge making a presupposition and a defendant around whom this presupposition revolves. In order not to undermine his credibility as a witness with readers, Nick does not employ any of these verbs. He thus gives one the impression that his recounting of the story is to be trusted. In one way or another, however, he ends up making a number of judgments, using other forms of presupposition triggers, which arguably influence readers’ own judgment.

Fitzgerald employs a fair number of triggers so as to make the reader anticipate the disillusionment of that sought-after American Dream, or rather the object of that dream, and the improbability of repeating the unparalleled past, portraying once
more the inescapable demise of his own dreams. In this way, Fitzgerald’s bias is evinced through his employment of presupposition triggers to exert influence on readers’ feelings, and impinge upon their freedom of interpretation, leading them, like himself, into collusion with the American Dream he unarguably condemns.

In short, the study concludes that the employment of presupposition triggers in the portion studied of the novel is extremely significant, and contributes to the overall idea, which Fitzgerald has experienced himself, that the American Dream is just a chimera. The types of lexical presupposition triggers present the atmosphere of reality versus illusion that dominates the novel. As it turns out, when it comes to the American Dream just as it is the case with presupposition, the closer one looks, the less one finds out he actually knows.
References:


Linguistica, 70(3), 297-335.


تصدي الحقيقة للوهم: مطلقات الافتراض المُسبَّق المعجمية على المستوى الروائي لشخصيات مختارة في رواية جاتسبي العظيم لفيتزجيرالد

الملخص:


الكلمات المفتاحية: مطلقات الافتراض المُسبَّق المعجمية، الوهم، فيتزجيرالد، جاتسبي العظيم، التحيز.